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CHRISTIANITY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM: 
A REPLY TO MEILAENDER 
James A. Keller 
In a recent paper, Gilbert Meilaender argues that Christian ethics must not be conse· 
quentialist. Though Meilaender does indicate some problems which may exist with 
certain consequentialist theories, those problems do not exclude all types of conse-
quentialist theories from consideration as Christian ethical theories. A consequential ism 
like R. M. Hare's offers virtually all the advantages Meilaender claims for his Chris-
tian deontological view. Moreover. Meilaender has overlooked certain advantages 
of consequentialism and certain disadvantages of the sort of deontological theory he 
espouses. 
In a recent paper in this journal, Gilbert Meilaender argues that any Christian 
ethics must not be consequentialist. I Though Meilaender does indicate some 
problems which may exist with certain consequentialist theories, those problems 
do not exclude all types of consequentialist theories from consideration as Chris-
tian ethical theories. A consequentialism like R. M. Hare's offers virtually all 
the advantages Meilaender claims for his Christian deontological view. More-
over, Meilaender has overlooked certain advantages of consequentialism and 
certain disadvantages of the sort of deontological theory he espouses. In this paper 
I want to develop and defend these claims. 
Meilaender's critique of consequentialism includes many of the standard ob-
jections: by placing on me an absolute obligation to maximize the good, it denies 
me any free time to pursue my own desires and denies also any possibility of doing 
more than duty requires; and by requiring me to adopt an impersonal standpoint 
regarding the good, it makes impossible any special duties or special love to those 
close to me (my family or friends) (400-407). But Meilaender does more than 
just level these standard criticisms; he places them within a context which is of 
special interest to readers of this journal. Consequentialism, he charges, involves 
at root a failure of humans to trust in God, to keep their place as finite creatures 
who are put in a particular place and given particular finite duties by a loving God 
who is the one responsible for the outcome. To adopt consequentialism is there-
fore to abandon our proper place and to try to adopt a divine standpoint and divine 
responsibility for the historical process; it is a failure of trust and the commission 
of the sin of pride (passim; e.g., 399,402). 
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Hare's Consequentialism 
It may be that Meilaender' s criticism is fully justified against certain versions of 
consequential ism; I would not want to try to defend all of them. But I want to show 
that it does not apply against certain versions of consequentialism, in particular 
against that of R. M. Hare, to which Meilaender makes several references. 2 
Hare says that moral thinking can occur on two levels: the intuitive and the 
critical. The intuitive level relies on general principles (moral rules). The rules 
used by a person were adopted by that person at some time in the past, either 
because they were taught or exemplified by some authority which the person 
trusted or because the person determined that this would be a proper rule to 
follow. The critical level does not rely on rules; rather it is the level used when 
one is considering what rules to adopt or whether (or how) to modify a rule; 
theoretically, it can also be used to determine what to do in a situation without 
any reference to rules. 3 Of course, when one is criticizing or modifying rules, 
one does so on the basis of consequentialist criteria: one tries to modify old rules 
or to adopt new rules whose adoption will result in human beings acting so as 
to achieve the greatest good possible by such limited beings. (We shall discuss 
below the nature and implications of those limitations.) 
Hare intends the distinction of the two levels to be completely general; any 
moral agent might think on either or both of these levels, depending on his other 
characteristics. As an expository aid, Hare invents the "archangel"-a person 
who never needs to use the intuitive level, for the archangel knows instantaneously 
everything about all the desires and feelings of everyone involved in a situation, 
knows instantaneously all the consequences of every possible action, and always 
effortlessly does what she knows will maximize the good. 
But it would be wrong to take the archangel as a kind of ideal moral thinker 
whom we humans should aspire to be like. We humans lack all three of the 
characteristics which make it possible for an archangel to operate solely on the 
critical level. Indeed we humans will have to operate most of the time on the 
intuitive level-living by moral rules we have adopted in the past. Hare is not 
as explicit about this as I would wish, but the overall tenor of his argument 
points inescapably in this direction. In most situations, human beings lack the 
knowledge to function as archangels, nor does life generally permit them time 
to acquire this knowledge in each situation before they must act; and even if it 
did, humans often lack the moral strength to do what such knowledge would 
indicate is right (H 44-46). Therefore, for consequentialist reasons it is very 
important that humans be well brought up, that they be furnished with moral 
rules to which they have a deep intellectual, affective, and conative commitment, 
and on which they habitually act in most situations. Thus Hare would agree with 
Meilaender that most of the time humans should make moral decisions on the 
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basis of moral rules which they have previously adopted. 
But if such moral rules are to function for human beings in this way, there are 
certain restrictions on them. They must not be too complicated for the average 
human to learn and apply (H 34-35); they must not require a level of moral will or 
dedication or self-sacrifice of which the average human is incapable (or to which 
the average human may not reasonably aspire) (H 200-201).4 Given these restric-
tions on the moral rules, Hare would agree with Meilaender that the moral rules by 
which human beings live must not require that they be working at every moment to 
maximize the good (for no human has the knowledge or moral strength to do so); 
therefore, the rules must permit free time and therefore also allow acts that exceed 
the demands of duty (as specified by the rules). Hare would also agree that the 
rules may allow or impose special duties to those close to us. 5 
The foregoing is the framework of Hare's way of employing the act -consequen-
tialismlrule-consequentialism distinction. This distinction, which has been the sub-
ject of much discussion, is strangely ignored by Meilaender, who writes as though 
the only sort of consequentialism were act-consequentialism. Many of his criti-
cisms are invalid against most types of rule-consequentialism, as readers familiar 
with the literature will recognize from my discussion of Hare's consequentialism. 
Admittedly, the distinction raises difficulties of its own, particularly those con-
cerning the justification of making moral decisions on the basis of following rules 
rather than on the basis of calculating the consequences of each act. But I think 
Hare's approach satisfactorily resolves those problems, for it bases the justification 
firmly on consequentialist grounds. He argues that if humans typically make moral 
decisions on the basis of moral rules which they have previously adopted, this 
strategy will result in their acting more nearly in accord with what an archangel 
would want them to do than any alternative strategy (e.g., trying to be archangels 
and decide what to do in each situation on the basis of a consequentialist calculation 
regarding the actions open to them in that situation.) 
But even if Hare can in this way defuse Meilaender's standard criticisms of con-
sequentialism, what of Meilaender's more original charges that consequentialism 
"asks us to think of love apart from trust," that it requires human beings to assume 
a God-like vantage point and responsibility for the success of the good, and thus 
that it requires them to commit the sin of pride? Hare does not speak to these points, 
so the following comments reflect my own attempt to apply an outlook like Hare's 
within an explicitly Christian context. First, we should recall Hare's insistence 
that moral rules are general principles meant to apply to human beings as they are 
in the situation ofthis actual world. If that situation includes the presence and activ-
ity of a loving God who can be counted on to do certain things, then that will affect 
what rules it is appropriate for human beings to adopt. I mean this not in the sense 
that if such a God commands something, it should be done, but in the sense that if 
such a God does certain things, then human beings do not have to do them (unless 
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they are things which God does through human beings). 
Second, Meilaender's criticism seems to be based on a confusion (or equation) 
of the criterion of a right action with the motive for doing the action. Suppose that 
I do (what an archangel would agree) is right, but I do it because it accords with a 
moral rule which I have learned; even if I have never thought about what makes the 
rule right, my action would still be right, and I might well merit moral praise for 
doing it. Human beings are human beings, not archangels, and it is and it is more 
more important that they do the right than that they understand the different levels 
of moral thinking or what ultimately justifies an action or a moral rule. 6 Indeed, 
when we act in accordance with a moral rule, most of us most of the time do 
not think about what justifies the rule. That we do not think about what justifies 
the rule does not, however, indicate that we are deontologists (as Meilaender 
perhaps assumes). For deontologists as well as consequentialists have a theory 
about what justifies moral rules, and we are not deontologists unless we accept 
a theory of that sort. 
The failure to distinguish between the criterion and the motive for a right 
action vitiates some of Meilaender's other criticisms of consequentialism. For 
example, at one point Meilaender acknowledges that there are consequentialist 
defenses for reading a book, taking a walk, and in general pursuing one's own 
desires. But he says that even if such justification is possible, "a task taken up 
for that reason can never be the same. 'The unbought grace of life' is missed 
when obligation replaces freedom" (405). I quoted his reply because I find it 
cryptic. But insofar as I understand it, I take him to be implying that a consequen-
tialist must justify each of these activities by showing that it promotes the good. 
But why could not a consequentialist say that having a rule which permits people 
some free time to use as they please promotes the good better than not having 
such a rule? Then there would be no need to show that what he was doing in 
his free time promoted the general good. In these free-time activities, he does 
what he does because he enjoys doing it. If he is worried about the justification 
for his having free time, he can (perhaps) provide it. But that justification for 
having free time is not the reason why he spends it as he does. (Compare this 
account with one Meilaender might give on behalf of the Christian deontologist. 
If asked why she is taking a walk, she might reply that it pleases her. If asked 
why she is not busy doing loving things for her neighbor, she might reply that 
God has given her the time. But that does not mean that she is spending the 
time as she is because God has given it to her; rather, she is spending it as she 
is because she desires to spend it in this way. The permission of God is not the 
direct reason why she is spending the time as she is. It plays a similar role to 
the consequentialist justification for allotting free time to individuals.) 
Similarly, Meilaender claims that consequentialism inevitably pressures a 
person into a calculating, deliberative mode and that this mode would preclude 
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the enjoyment of many pleasures which can be experienced only if we do not 
aim at them (405). And he suggests "that most of us, most of the time, ought 
not try to live each moment as if we were consequentialists" (406), an idea he 
attributes to Sidgwick. These conclusions about the mode of our lives and about 
how we should live each moment are ones which Hare would, I think, embrace. 
But once again, they lose their force against consequentialism if it is seen as 
providing the criterion for a right action, but not necessarily the motive. 
Perhaps underlying the failure to distinguish the criterion and the motive of 
right action is a failure to consider the different ways in which the consequentialist 
criterion of right actions might be used in evaluating moral rules. There are at 
least two important issues involved in this matter. One is whether it is to be a 
negative criterion or a positive one-i.e., should a moral rule be accepted unless 
it can be shown not to contribute to the maximization of the good or should it 
be accepted only if it can be shown to contribute to that good? The other is 
whether it need be applied prospectively or only under challenge-i.e., must 
the rule be justified (in one of the foregoing senses) before the person can be 
morally correct in living by it, or is it sufficient that it can be shown to be 
justified if it is challenged? I am not aware of any place where Hare speaks to 
either of these points, so I can only suggest what I think is consistent with his 
overall approach. I am quite sure that he would not insist on prospective justifi-
cation of all moral rules; he is too aware of limitations on human ability and 
time to impose such a requirement. But it would seem proper to require it before 
a new rule is adopted. I am less sure about what Hare would say on the other 
issue, but I suspect that he would require a positive justification only for rules 
which impose positive duties but only a negative justification for rules which 
impose negative duties. For positive duties limit our ability to pursue our desires 
more than negative duties do; and since in general the good tends to be achieved 
more fully when people can pursue their desires, a stronger kind of justification 
would be required for rules which impose positive duties. 
One implication of the foregoing distinctions is that the consequentialist need 
not take it upon herself to provide a justification for every moral rule by which 
she lives, nor need she even abandon every such rule unless she can show it to 
be positively justified. She might well accept most of the rules by which she 
lives without qualm or question, believing that they have emerged through human 
interaction in such a way as generally to promote the good. If she is a Christian 
consequentialist, she may even ascribe this propitious outcome to the providence 
of God. But though she may believe that the moral rules governing her society 
generally promote human good, she will not be unwilling or unable to evaluate 
one or more of them critically, should the need arise. (The Christian consequen-
tialist will remember that here in via the world suffers from the effects of human 
sinfulness as well as benefitting from the providence of God.) 
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The foregoing also enables us to see why Meilaender is wrong in claiming 
that consequentialism results in a division between those who can "rise to the 
impersonal standpoint of an objective calculator of the general wellbeing" and 
those who cannot, with the former manipulating the latter (406). To see why 
this need not happen, recall that most of us, including even the best human 
calculators, most of the time will (and should!) act in accordance with moral 
rules which we have accepted and whose justification we usually do not think 
about. And when these rules conflict, any of us (not just an elite) may engage 
in critical thinking about which rule to follow. When new information or a new 
situation arises which seems to call into question some accepted rule, society 
will understandably want any help available to determine whether some new 
rule would better promote the general good. If some are particularly good cal-
culators (i.e., skilled in the relevant types of thinking), society will especially 
welcome their help. Are such people therefore superior to those who are not as 
skilled? Perhaps they are, just as those who can understand calculus are superior 
to those who cannot. But their "superiority" is not a moral superiority and is far 
less important than the superiority of those whose actions promote the general 
good over those whose actions do not; that is the superiority which truly matters 
to the consequentialist. Thus a consequentialist who is superior in the relevant 
sort of thinking has no basis for believing himself part of an elite group.7 Nor 
is there any reason to think that the better calculators will manipulate others. 
They can be quite open about their reasons for advocating the moral rules which 
they do, and their proposals might be adopted because people believe that they 
are a way to improve society. 
The Advantages of Consequentialism 
Thus far most of my argument has merely tended to show that the advantages 
which Meilaender claims for his type of Christian deontological view can be 
matched by Hare's type of consequentialism. The issue between them is nut 
whether people should generally live by moral rules, but how those rules should 
be justified. But Hare's consequential ism is not simply another way to achieve 
those advantages, for there are at least four other advantages to Hare's view 
which are not matched by Meilaender's. 
First, Hare's view gives us a way of deciding what to do when moral rules 
conflict and a way of evaluating moral rules when new situations cause us to 
wonder whether some revision is needed. That moral rules will sometimes conflict 
is virtually inevitable. A moral rule applies when a situation has certain features; 
a different rule will apply when it has other features. But sometimes situations 
will occur which have both sets of features and when the moral rules will direct 
us to take inconsistent actions. Every moral system needs some way to deal with 
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such conflicts; Meilaender does not indicate what method he would use to deal 
with them. 8 Moreover, as new situations arise, old rules may need to be revised, 
and new rules may need to be formulated; sometimes this can be done by making 
a new application of some existing, more basic moral rule. But is there any 
guarantee that this will always be possible? And if not, how shall we go about 
changing old rules and formulating new ones? Hare's position at least gives us 
a method. Admittedly, we may sometimes lack the knowledge or the time to 
apply the method, but at least sometimes it will give us an answer. 9 
A second advantage of Hare's approach is that it makes possible a fruitful 
dialogue between those who live by different moral rules. When talking with 
those who live by different rules, Meilaender will have to appeal to his knowledge 
of God's commands; and if his opponents do likewise (or appeal to their intui-
tions), there seems little possibility for any fruitful exchange between them about 
which rules to live by. Of course, if my rules applied only to me and your rules 
applied only to you, then there would be no need for dialogue; each person could 
live by his own moral rules. But society cannot function this way. Some rules 
must apply to everyone; on only a certain range of matters can society permit 
each person to live by his or her own rules. But how shall we determine which 
rules will apply to everyone? By each person's appealing to his or her own 
perception of God's commands (or intuitions) or by appeal to a shared criterion? 
A third advantage is related to the second one. Not only does Hare's consequen-
tialism offer a basis for fruitful dialogue between people who adhere to different 
rules, it positively encourages an adherent to engage in dialogue with other people. 
For if the good which I am seeking to foster is a good which depends on others' 
desires and the quality of others' experiences, how can I intelligentl y determine 
which rules will foster that good except by coming to know other people? Thus, 
the very process of resolving conflicts among rules and of determining whether 
some rules need revision will force me to get to know my fellow human beings. 
Meilaender's approach does not require this; it does not even seem to promote it. 
A fourth advantage is one to which Meilaender alludes (400, 402): there appears 
to be an important similarity between the principle of promoting the general good 
and the command to love one's neighbor. Meilaender regards this appearance as 
deceptive, but his reasons are simply those criticisms of consequentialism which 
we have already considered and rejected. So let us reexamine this apparent simi-
larity. Suppose that we are Christians and that we regard the command to love our 
neighbor as the chief commandment governing our relations to others. Suppose 
too that we come to doubt whether one of the moral rules by which we are living 
really does enhance our ability to treat others in a loving way. Shall we simply 
suppress our doubts and rely on tradition? Or shall we try to determine whether the 
rule does enhance our ability to love? If we do the latter, how shall we determine 
whether or not it does? One way would be to see whether following the rule seems 
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likely to promote more good for human beings than following any alternative we 
can think of. This would be the Christian consequentialist's way; I find it very 
plausible. What alternative would Meilaender propose? 
There is a related point growing out of the command to love our neighbor. To 
obey this command, we must have a more specific idea of what it requires. And 
surely among those requirements are meeting the needs, and being responsive to 
the desires, of others. This sounds like a modest consequentialism, even if it is for 
the sake of the love command. Meilaender might reply that we are not responsible 
for the success of our efforts to do loving things for our neighbor. I would agree 
(provided this is not made an excuse for laziness or half-heartedness), but the 
precise form our efforts should take is nevertheless determined (at least in part) 
by consequentialist considerations. 
Finally, I wish to say a word about what I am tempted to term the homiletic 
aspects of Meilaender's paper. He suggests not only that consequentialists are 
wrong, but that they are guilty of a lack of trust in God and of pride in their own role 
in the scheme of things; moreover, he adds, "when the Christian virtues of trust, 
love, and hope mutually interpenetrate our character, we may recognize in con-
sequentialist moral theory the voice of the serpent" (405). I am uncertain how 
seriously he intends these comments to be taken. All of them are supported by 
other things he says in the article. But it leaves us who disagree with him in a rather 
uncomfortable position: not only are we wrong, but our position involves us in 
serious moral lapses as well. How can one reply to such a charge without com-
pounding one's fault? Let me attempt to do so in this way. Meilaendermay be right 
on these charges, just as he may be right on the non-moral faults of consequen-
tialism. I do not think he is, but I am far from infallible and he may be right. And 
even if these moral faults are not inevitable accompaniments of being a consequen-
tialist, they may well be faults to which consequentialism predisposes its adherents. 
But I think it is also true that deontologists may be similarly predisposed to certain 
other sins. One is mentioned by Meilaender himself: he identifies as the sin of sloth 
the refusal to exercise one's limited freedom to transcend one's own perspective 
and to try to appreciate the perspective of others in order to be fair to them (399). 
But a related pair he omits: the sins of pride and self-righteousness based on one's 
conviction that one knows God's will. Warfare among various Christian groups 
and religious persecution of minorities are just a few of the worst examples of 
actions based on these sins. I do not suggest that these sins are the inescapable 
result of holding a Christian deontological position; I claim only that it provides a 
more fertile ground for them than does Christian consequentialism, just as the 
latter provides a more fertile ground than the former for other sins. 
Wofford College 
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NOTES 
I. "Eritis Sicut Deus: Moral Theory and the Sin of Pride," Faith and Philosophy, III, 4 (October 
1986), 397-415. Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to this article. 
2. My account of Hare's view will be based on his Moral Thinking, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1981). Page references to this work will be identified in the text as H followed by the page 
number(s). 
3. I say "theoretically" because, as we shall see, the requirements for doing this are almost such 
as to preclude a human being from doing it. Only rarely, if ever, could one meet them. I think that 
humans should use the critical level almost exclusively for evaluating moral rules or for resolving 
conflicts among them. 
4. This somewhat oversimplifies Hare's position. He recognizes that people differ in their capacities. 
Those who have the capacity to be saints should strive to be. But we should not require this of 
everyone. Thus, he will countenance some moral rules of differing stringency for different people 
(H 20\); adopting the more stringent rules would typically be the result of one's own decision, either 
directly or by one's joining a particular group which adhered to those more stringent rules (e.g., a 
monastic community). But he also says that some rules apply to everyone (H 200). Those rules that 
apply to everyone presumably must not exceed the capacity of most people. 
5. At one point Meilaender characterizes this sort of defense of consequential ism as a "grudging 
acquiescence to our finite nature" (406). Perhaps it would be for some consequentialists, but it is 
not for Hare---or for me. Moral rules must be appropriate to the beings to whom they apply. We 
are concerned with moral rules for human beings. We should begrudge the effects which human 
limitations have on the rules only if we begrudge those very limitations which make us human. Why 
should it be thought necessary that all consequentialists do this? Some may have, but so may some 
Christian deontologists. 
6. In the Preface to his book Hare writes "that the quality of mutual love and affection between 
people, without which our life would have few joys, cannot be had without the right dispositions; 
and ... these dispositions, therefore, are the condition of both happiness and morality" (H vii). 
7. The dangers of creating an elite group who (justifiably or not) claim to be better at knowing 
what is good and right are not peculiar to consequentialist ethics. In any ethical system some will 
be better than others at figuring out what it requires, whether that be through discerning the will of 
God, intuiting our duty, etc. The problem of elitism is best dealt with by denying that superiority 
in this ability constitutes moral superiority. 
8. The closest he comes is his acknowledgment of the need to recognize that moral rules are 
complex and that we must employ exception-clauses in the moral mles we adopt (409), but he gives 
no hint how we are to determine which exception-clauses are correct. (He also has a longer discussion 
of rare situations which he terms "supreme emergencies" (409); but what he says about these situations 
sheds no light on the more ordinary situations with which I am concerned.) 
9. When we lack the time or knowledge to engage in critical thinking, Hare's consistent recommen-
dation is that we follow our current moral rules. 
